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The Art of Dissent: Parody, Travesty and Irony in Late Soviet Culture
Dmitri Shalin
Irony is the favorite tool of Russian postmodernists fighting discourse
totalitarianism. They wield it like a crowbar to pry open in the simulacrum,
to tear down the Potemkin portable villages built by forced discursive
labor. Every new blow the ironist strikes against the official reality
reaffirms his intonational freedom amidst the most coercive discourse. An
ultimate weapon of the spiritual proletariat, irony proves to the intellectual
that he is a subject rather than an object of discourse. Alas, ironic vigil
takes its toll. The self busily disclaiming identity with itself loses track of
what it really is. It knows not how to commit, empathize, make believe.
Deconstructive irony is a radical epoche whose subject lost control over
his destiny and no longer knows how to throw the parodic stick shift into
reverse. Irony is indeed a double-edged sword: its corrosive edge cuts
those who evade pathos and greets with cynicism constructive
engagement. Irony can be construed as a dissimulative gesture signaling
to the audience that the individual's face is but a mask, that discursive
performance is not to be taken literally. Along with this gesture comes a
deep aversion to direct speech. The postmodernist is someone who can't
say I love you without immediately putting quotation marks around his
words. He wants to distance himself from direct speech, ostensibly to
protect himself from discourse's totalitarian proclivities and poshlost, but
in the process he does violence to his own voice, suppresses its non-ironic
modalities.
Irony is variously present in such literary genres as satire, parody and
travesty. Its vocal counterpart is pathos, which thrives in epic and lyrical
genres. These are two poles in a vocal continuum that we use to construct
and deconstruct our social worlds. Without going into detailed discussions
and definitions, let me say that satire scorns, parody mocks, travesty
feigns, irony winks, bathos affects, and pathos makes believe. (I hesitate
to place irony squarely in this continuum as it partakes in many genres,
but I feel it could function as a particular speech genre, in which case it
might have a rightful places somewhere between parody and travesty).
Judged from this continuum, ironic modes are no more important for our
sane existence than pathetic modes. Irony comes in handy when
discourse grows too solemn and pious. Pathos is called for when discourse
becomes derisive, irreverent and sacrilegious. Irony is indispensable as a
hygiene to protect our faces underneath official mask, to poke fun at selfimportant heroes and repressive institutions. We need self-parody "to

disabuse others of the very ideas we press on them," as Mikhail Epstein
put it felicitously (see his letter to me in our conference file). Tieck,
Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Herzen and Kierkegaard paid homage to irony's
magic touch. "He who does not understand irony and has no ear for its
whisperings," wrote Kierkegaard in his doctoral dissertation, "lacks eo
ipso what might be called the absolute beginnings for the personal life,
lacks the bath of rejuvenation. He does not know the invigoration and
fortification which, should the atmosphere become too oppressive comes
from lifting oneself up and plunging into the ocean of irony, not in order to
remain there, of course, but healthily, gladly, lightly to clad oneself again"
(Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press [1841] 1965 p. 339). But irony ceases to be a defensive
tactic and grows noxiously offensive when it leaves no room for the lyrical
"I" and shows contempt for tact, adopts an in-your-face attitude.
Seriousness is OK when it knows its limits, Bakhtin tells us. I would argue
that the same applies to parody and irony.
Laughter has its violent side. Sometimes we need pathos to counter it, to
extricate our words from quotation marks and turn another's speech into
your own. Everyone is an ironist these days, Alexander Block commented
earlier this century, and added that now it would take courage not to be
ironic. Indeed, pathos requires courage when the time has come to
suspend doubt and make a commitment; it builds bridges and makes
fantasy come true; it calls for empathy and affirms solidarity with the
other; it sets you into an e-motion without which your social construction
falls apart. Just as irony, pathos can grow offensive, arrogant and
coercive. It happens whenever it seeks to impose on others a politically
correct line, frowns on unorthodox discourses, and treats everyone who
begs to differ as a misfit whose consciousness needs to be raised. Every
society seems to go through cycles where the ironic or the pathetic mode
takes ascendence among its members. Cynicism and ethical commitment
trade places. Late Soviet and early postcommunist culture have been
marked by the excessive irony whose Homeric energies will be felt for a
long time. But there are signs that its supremacy is withering away, as
more ambivalent, lyrical modes come to the fore.
Given this historical dynamics, it seems prudent to ask if Russian
postmodernists are mistaking their sordid historical conditions for the
primordial nature of being. The schizophrenic discourse they embraced
may have something to do with the schizophrenic realities surrounding
them on all fronts. There is enough inanity in the world to make me
wonder whether humanity will eventually succumb to chaos. The bubble of
sanity we inhabit can burst at any time. But whatever the outcome, I

doubt it will have been destiny. We are participant observers in the world
historical drama, and our actions just might tip the scale and make one
outcome or the other more certain.
Venichka looks around and sees nothing but chaos. He cries for help -none is forthcoming from his fellow men. He turns his eyes heavenly -the Lord has forsaken him. We are led to believe that there is no hope in
sight. But is it a fact or is it a figment of his alcoholic imagination? Was
chance his true destiny or did he seal his own fate by yielding to the
forces of chaos? Was his flight into insanity an act of courage or a pathetic
copout? One can argue that postmodernism simply inoculates us from the
insanity of this world, one can make the case that it helps spread the
disease. As I said on various occasions, postmodernism is much too
diverse a current to lend itself to easy generalization; there is much in it
that is exciting, even wise. Still, I feel some of its proponents take
themselves too seriously. The irony is that postmodernism threatens to
become political correctness for our times. The grandest narrative of them
all, it spawns the repressive tolerance once attributed to the liberal
establishment. Its proponents reject maximalism, absolutism,
totalitarianism but they do so in a curiously maximalist, absolutist and
totalizing fashion. One is reminded of Turgenev's hero who sets out to
prove that everything in this world is relative. "Are you sure about that?",
he is asked. To which he replies: "ABSOLUTELY!"
Like a weather vane that dutifully follows the wind's direction and serves
as its faithful index, conceptualists feel the bygone era's violent winds,
which weathered their bodies and dried up their souls. Like a dumb idol
forced to partake in a pagan ritual through its very iconicity,
conceptualists show more than a fleeting family resemblance to idols and
idolatry they mock. Like a jester who feigns it doesn't hurt at all when
somebody slaps him in the face, conceptualists escape into irony to cover
up the stinging pain from a ghastly spectacle in which they were
symbolically implicated. Their faces are contorted in a grimace signifying
disengagement, but their expressions are iconic as much as they are
ironic. It is this bio-social semiotic of postmodernist aesthetics in general
and Russian conceptualism in particular that interests me greatly. Icon,
index, symbol -- these are the three basic sign forms. Postmodernists
come conceptualists work closely with all three, but they pretend that
their icons and indexes are mere "linguistic symbols," whose own body is
supposed to be indifferent to the events they signify. Yet, they hardly
escape the culture's inexorable iconicity and indexicality. The conceptualist
simulating gesture has an unmistakably dissimulating ring to it. The joke

may be on the joker, after all.
Baudrillard's notion of "simulacrum" needs to be complemented by
another one -- "dissimulacrum." If simulacrum is a copy masquerading as
reality, then dissimulacrum is reality masquerading as fiction. A simulator
pretends that something is there when it is not. A dissimulator pretends
that there is nothing when there is something. The former wishes to pass
his mask for a face, the latter is trying to convince us that his is "really" a
mask. One is busy imitating enthusiasm, constructive activity, and
meaningful social routines, the other rushes to disassemble or dissemble
them even before they are brought into being. One fakes total presence,
the other feigns total absence. In short, the two are twins; theirs is a
siblings' rivalry; the one can hardly do its job without the other, as they
continue to pretend that they pretend or that they don't. Culture does not
so much lose its body in these exercises as it whittles down its
emotionally-laden substance and masks its all too real deformities. The
postmodernist escape from soma into the playfully linguisticized discourse
strikes me as a symptom. Of what?
The postmodern ironists' dis-ease with their own materiality indicates a
spirit that has grown weary of its gravity-bound incarnations. Russian
conceptualists are particularly at home in this strenuous self-denial, their
attitude fed by centuries of neglect and denigration that body had been
exposed to in Russian culture. I see this attitude in early Russian monks
who mortified their flesh and preached silence as the highest form of
devotion. It is evident in Vladimir Soloviev and Nikolai Fedorov with their
quest for degendered existence and purely spiritual love. Its traces could
be found in Nikolai Berdiaev and Alexander Block who experimented with
the idea of sexless marriage, mixed with khlysty, and evinced profound
ambivalence about human flesh. The Russian dis-ease with the body and
its mundane functions is nowhere more evident than in the Russian
sectarian movement. Its members' self-flagellational vigils were designed
to elevate spiritual culture over its profane embodiments, but there was
enough room for doubt left as to whether the secret pleasures the
participants experienced in the process were entirely spiritual. Theology
and art seem to work here hand-in-hand, disembodying culture,
sublimating it into a symbolic apparitions, castigating the body as an
unsavory vessel for the sacred soul. Or as you put it yourself so
eloquently, "it is reality, brimming with health, full and round to the eye,
that would rather serve the demonic seduction of humanity, turning it
toward the earthly path and away from the celestial" (p. 58). The critique
you offer toward the end of your book shows your more nuanced attitude
toward postmodernism and conceptualism, but I think it needs to go

further in thematizing the Russian predilection for cultural disembodiment.
The disembodied ideal of culture I detect in Russian conceptualism is
matched by the dismembered concept of language, the disemboweled
notion of semiotics, and the dissembling blueprint for ethics. All these
features are consistent with the postmodernist corpus.
Take, for instance, postmodernist linguistics. It is thoroughly Saussurian
in its binary thinking. The signifier is directly linked here with the signified,
the sign is explicated through other signs, the meaning is transparent to
the interpreter's gaze, and speech is a function of grammatical code
enciphered in language. The semiotics that grew from this view has no
use for human body, emotions, and voice; it dissolves semeiosis into
voiceless discourse that speaks the speaker and signifies the signifier.
Humans are always the signified here. They re-produce the linguistic code
rather than produce it. Everything that could be said and is worth saying
has already been said. We can only mouth the episteme and replicate the
hyperreal copy. An original uttering is a theoretical impossibility.
This postmodernist creed contrasts with the semiotics developed by
Charles Peirce and his pragmatist followers, who prefer the triadic model
to the binary one. The relationship between the signifier and the signified
is mediated here by an interpretive act, which completes the natural
semeiosis. Our interpretive practices endow the word with meaning and
breathe life into the inanimate linguistic machinery. Without the signifying
act, the word -- language -- signifies nothing. It comes to mean
something in deed and in situ, when the subject picks from its possible
senses the one most needed and takes it to mean something definitive,
not for all but very specific practical purposes. According to Peirce, James,
Dewey, and Mead, signification is not just a mental act: it could be a
feeling, an action, a habit which tests the meaning we assign to things
and situations against their obdurate properties and social valences.
Linguistic signification grows from prelinguistic, nonsymbolic forms of
semeiosis, which humans share with their protosapient ancestors. Our
vocal gestures are implicated here – a not as surface phenomena akin to
droning and muttering but as bio-social events deeply rooted in our body.
Voice, golos, is not just a capacity to golosovat, make empty political
utterances. It is vested in the human body and it goes to its emotional
core. Unlike discourse, voice exists in real time and space and triggers
momentous physiological processes. Activated by our vocal cords and
tongue, our voice reverberates with feelings, quivers with emotions, it has
a certain diction that usually tells us more than the self-conscious subject
seeks to communicate. Even when voice simulates and dissimulates, it has

an undeniable presence; it lets us in onto real events which no ironic
discourse could camouflage. (I shall note parenthetically that
dramaturgical act is always transcendental and transcendental act is
always dramatic). Distorted, tortured though Gorbachev's glasnost might
have been, it was no mere "voiceness," as you seem to imply (p. 97). It
gave hope to many people who were not completely jaded or lulled by
decades of ideological droning. The violent shrieks and howls we are
hearing ever since are genuine indexes, whose bio-social semiotics
bespeaks a repressed culture that is finally baring its emotional wounds.
In this reckoning, it would seem to make more sense to talk about
"ideospeech" than "ideolanguage." Not just because Russian ideological
tetrads translate so well into other languages, or because shrewd
politicians and con-artists have deployed them since Thucydides, though
these are weighty portends. The point is rather that doublespeak reveals
itself in paralinguistic tell-tell signs even more vividly than in its lexical
and syntactic patterns. I agree with you that ideology is first and foremost
about power, but I don't think language is to blame. Ideology engenders a
distorted emotional culture of intolerance and hate, which bursts through
and makes its hegemonic presence felt in ideospeech acts. It is at this
embodied level that debased culture shows to us its true physiognomy.
We feel it in our twisted guts, faces contorted into fake smiles,
expressions of hate frozen in our eyes, and other emotionally vested value
judgments we pass on the world and our selves. We can simulate and
dissimulate these semiotic indexes, but they are a presence no
deconstructive finesse could erase. The recourse to irony does not help
the matter. It adds a new cycle to the dissmimulational spiral and helps
hide the snarled web of the ironist's motivations. "Irony is almost
inevitable where mind is at cross-purpose with the heart," says Georgy
Fedotov (Sudby i Grekhi Rossii, Vol. 2, p. 344). If so, then the
conceptualists' ironic vigil hints at a crying gap between their heartfelt
emotions audible in their voices and anesthetized minds inscribed in their
discourse.
Does conceptualist art imitate life or is it the other way around? I do not
know nearly enough about conceptualists' personal habits to have the
answer, but I would venture a hypothesis that there is a linkage between
their lives and their art, that the conceptualists' ironic detachment from
ideological hyperreality spills over into their relationships with flesh and
blood people. Conceptualist art, and more broadly postmodernist
discourse, engenders a certain ethos: the in-your-face ethics of putdown
and insult. When Baudrillard says, "I don't want culture, I spit on it"
(Forget Foucault, p. 81), you can clearly sense venom in his voice and

visualize an indexical gesture. Conceptualist artists mimic the same
gesture, as they settle the old accounts with their tormentors.
Conceptualists are not as violently inclined as some radical
postmodernists, but I sense a passive-aggressive attitude in their voice
which heaps scorn on those who don't see things their way.
Conceptualist art is hyperrepresentational, in that it seeks to convey not
things themselves but their ideological essences. Conceptualism sucks into
itself bits and pieces of reality, and in the process purifies its objects from
humanity they once embodied. So, what is left is a cipher, an ideological
code, cartoonish characters set into motion by the omnipotent puppet
master. Hence, Kibirov's "Speech by the Comrade Chernenko," where his
astringent imagination brings to life the living corpse of the General
Secretary addressing a Soviet writers' meeting. Everybody in this clever
satire is a nincompoop. There is a slew of well known characters who show
up at the scene, decked out with the all too familiar claptrap: Evtushenko,
"barely able to hold back his feelings"; Bergolts and Inber, "wailing like
common harridans;" Samoilov, "applauding nobly with restraint";
Erenburg, Pasternak, Rozhdestvensky take their turns, dutifully signing
their obeisance to the party line; they are followed by Block, Puskin,
Lermontov, Dante, and Homer who make a brief appearance to give the
happening a phantasmagoric dimension. A few tangible details crop up
here and there (Pasternak looks like a "startled child," Rasputin "for a
moment forgot about his beloved Lake Baikal "), but these quasi-personal
tidbits only underscore the spectacle's studied one-dimensionality. It must
be real fun to jerk these straw men and women around, dissolve them in
the ideological formalin, burn them in effigies. One longs for a noncomic
relief, but none is forthcoming.
While the Soviet Writers' Union was in place, such a spoof had real bite.
When the same method of turning people into their linguistic shadows is
employed today, it becomes an ideology, an ethical imperative to cut
everybody down to size. Lev Rubinstein's extensive catalogue of
commonplace utterances that he assembles on index cards and reads in a
more or less random fashion implies that people are walking cliches with
no emotional substance to their verbalizations. We are all cultural dupes,
the writer tells us, eager to consume linguistic garbage and bound to
reproduce unreflexively the existing order of things. We feign being alive,
for there is no reality behind our spurious yearnings. We simulate with
vengeance, all of us, except maybe for conceptualists themselves, who
have figured out the charade and managed to escape the common dupery
through their ironic overextension of idiomatic commonplaces. I am yet to
come across a postmodernist willing to say, "I am a cultural dupe, wired

to the media, bent on mindless consumption, and faithfully reproducing
hegemonic institutions." Ilya Kabakov comes closest to admitting that
much. When Oskar Rabin approached him regarding participation in the
famous Bulldozer exhibition of 1974, Kabakov turned him down and
allegedly said, "All my life I have crawled on four feet. I stand up on four
feet. And you are trying to stand like a normal person on two legs"
(Komar and Melamid, in Baigell and Baigell, eds., Soviet Dissident Artists,
p. 268). This is a graphic -- iconic -- description, hinting at the toll Soviet
culture exacted from its artists. But even Kabakov couldn't say it in all
sincerity; his confession was tongue-in-cheek; his artistry expressed a
thoroughly nonconformist spirit. The postmodernists' stance implies that
its practitioners are autonomous subjects, endowed with taste,
perspective, and critical judgment. Why, then, deny critical agency to
others?
As the above example suggests, language furnishes us with all purpose
linguistic frames that mean everything and nothing at the same time, and
that to mean something, they have to be appropriated by speakers and
deployed in situ and in actu. Words and concepts are but samples of
frozen semantic sperm gathered in dictionary tubes, stored away in
textbook vaults, and waiting to be fertilized in speech acts. For a
conception to occur, there must be speakers lending their voices to
impersonal discourses in mundane situations where chosen meanings are
acted upon in earnest make-believe.
Postmodernists qua conceptualists fail to imagine that "concept" is more
than a purely verbal device -- konzept. Concept is a seed of future reality,
a semantic chromosome that carries within itself a genetic code waiting to
be decoded in speech. Thanks to our concepts, we can "conceive" things
as meaningful objects and populate with their namesakes landscapes in
our emergent uni-verse, literally "one verse" recited by those who inhabit
a given universe. New verses mean new uni-verses. Were it not for
embodied speech practices, the luscious landscapes comprising our
universe would break apart into randomly scattered objects. Every
meaningful event is conceived on location, in a situation implicating the
other, where logos can satisfy its prodigious erotic appetites and where
idea and matter can penetrate each other, germinating in a definite thing.
Once conceived, things don't exist as meaningful objects for all eternity;
they have to be reconceived with every human encounter. One thing may
turn up as many objects, and one object could be impersonated by many
different things. When particulars are brought into being as concrete
universals, they have a certain emotional afterglow, a kind of birthmark
which distinguishes a thing for us from a thing in itself. This

metamorphosis requires a social setting and a live transaction, without
which our language games remain sterile.
The endless play of difference we find in deconstructionist texts occasions
few extratextual events. One sign begets the other but scarcely any
engenders the inhabitable universe. The offsprings that come from
deconstructionist texts are typically stillborn, unable to stir our feelings,
plunge us into e-motions, move us. Whatever embryo of meaning is
conceived in the conceptualist mind is promptly killed by its deconstructive
imagination. The latter doesn't like to carry its babies to term, relying on
irony as an all-purpose contraceptive device. No sooner does sentiment
escapes its rib cage, that conceptualists pluck its feathers and clip its
wings with their ironic tweezers. Deconstructive irony is a dissimulating
gesture, a dissimulacrum which puts our self into quotation marks to
prevent it from being taken seriously and engendering a meaningful
reality. It is a functional equivalent of birth control -- a symbolic rubber
wrapped around emotions to make sure no conception will take place.
Notice that Russian conceptualism wasn't always radically deconstructive.
It started as an inspired satire on socialist realism and its pompous style - a "nostalgic socialist realism," pioneered, or at least popularized, by
Komar and Melamid. Like a grown up stumbling on a wooden horse he
rode with zest in childhood, Russian conceptualists look back at their
young pioneer neckties and realize in astonishment that they once wore
them with pride. Komar and Melamid's childhood is still glowing with warm
memories of hot pursuits and boy scout exploits, but this benign
sentiment soon gives way to more conflicted emotions. Ambivalence
merges with resentment, resentment breeds irritation, irritation shades
into contempt and occasions a smirk at any one who might still harbor the
feelings once felt by conceptualists, who have finally grown too big for
their britches. In developed conceptualist art one finds little humor and
plenty of sarcasm aimed at inane rituals and coercive discipline imposed
on the not so young pioneers by their stalwart jailers/teachers.
What gives real pathos to conceptualists' irony is their first-hand
experience with the communist grand narrative. As all Soviet citizens,
Russian conceptualists were forced to put on uniforms and dramatize
inane realities as meaningful and sane. We know what it feels like when
you lend your face to the cause you loath or look the other way as
somebody else's soul is tortured on the racks. That's when irony is
summoned to help abort the bastardly reality conceived against our will.
But the imbecilic creatures we abort are our offsprings. Every one of us,
conceptualists included, could be slapped with a paternity suit, for we did

take part in the debased discourse and helped nurture socialist realities. It
is therefore a double irony that we witness here. Those very faces that
produced hateful reality labored hard to cut it down to size with their
ironic gestures. We could be charged in "consorting with an enemy" as
well as taken to court for "illegal abortion." As a matter of fact, some
especially brave and brazen ironists among us were taken to court for that
very crime, known in common parlance as "anti-Soviet agitation and
propaganda."
Putting this into semiotic terms, we can say that ironic gesture is always
iconic and indexical, that it implicates ironists in the reality they bracket.
You can distance yourself from the mask you are wearing, but your own
face is sucked into the dramaturgical act. Thus, quotation marks you place
around swearing (a racial slur, a blasphemous word) does not prevent
some of it from rubbing off on you. Andy Warhol assumes an ironic
posture when he says that artists who cannot sell their art are failures,
but he means it more than he pretends. He purports to debunk
consumerism of late capitalism, but sets up an "artistic factory" which
churns out millions of dollars' worth of commodities that have been sold
on capitalist markets. While Woody Allen mocks himself in front of the
audience, he manages to transcend his predicament, but the relief he
gains is temporary; it lasts while he is performing on stage in front of an
audience. He has to keep jesting and parodying himself, lest somebody
notices that he only pretends to pretend, that his willfully donned mask of
a meshuganah from Brooklyn is really a naked face contorted in selfloathing. Irony helps vent anger and dull the pain, but the relief is shortlived. It is a plague and a therapy at the same time, it is a spectacle which
lets us fight pain with laughter, a carnival where you can wear the mask
of otherness pretending it is not your real self. Postmodern ironists are
bent on turning life into a never-ending carnival where they can don their
masks in a never-ending game of dissimulation. But the ploy threatens to
fall apart and bury compulsive ironists under its debris. Just as people
stricken with leprosy in the medieval times turned their stigma into a
mark of a true chosenness, decontructive ironists claim that their stigma
is a blessing in disguise. They are postmodern stigmatics who endeavor to
bear the cross for all of us but end up being crushed by the burden. (Did
you notice that jesters and ironists are very sad creatures who are apt to
fall into the blackest depression?).
The radically deconstructive irony that sprouted in the postmodern age
has little resemblance to its romantic predecessor. Ironic detachment
ceased to be a defensive strategy designed to protect one's face beneath
the official mask and is transformed into an offensive weapon used to

clobber over the head anyone who begs to differ. It is no longer self-irony
hinting at the self that it is at odds with itself, but a diatribe directed at
the lifeworld and the dupes inhabiting it. For all their talk about the other
and alterity, postmodernists don't have much respect for the sanctity of
the other person's selfhood, which they put down and eviscerate with their
ironic stratagems. Deconstructive irony is cheerless, its playfulness is
forced, its voice growing hoarser by the minutes as it mounts an all-out
assault on meaning and meaningfulness. Sharpened on the anvil of
deconstructive irony, conceptualism turns into the art of universal
putdown, which leaves an indelible mark on its practitioners. Prigov shows
little mercy and takes no prisoners. Kabakov tells us our life is garbage.
Sorokin is bent on painting us as living corpses. Rubinstein is convinced
that we are walking cliches. This conceptualist art evinces few traces of
nostalgia. Early Kibirov has a gentler touch, but even he couldn't resist the
temptation of reducing people to their cartoonish shadows. He laments
the plight of his protagonists, but his tears are mostly fake.
Today, conceptualism is no longer a mere epater la bourgeoisie. It
becomes far more ambitious as conceptualists take on being as such.
Unsheathed before our eyes is a metaphysical irony that contrives to
unmask the entire universe of meaning as a fraud. Conceptualism casts its
jaundiced eye at the world and finds it lacking in any credibility. Every
political platform is a lie, postmodernists tell us, every paradigm is a
hoax; there is no being, only emptiness and death lurking beneath our
phony selves and feigned enthusiasms. Whatever identity we claim to
possess is counterfeit. Our hopes, dreams, desires, commitments are
pathetic ploys that keep us from looking into the deathly abyss hidden just
below the surface. Nothingness, sheer nothingness, beribboned and
engraved, is what conceptualists extol in their most fervent prayers and
what we are to embrace as the only authentic presence.
If you want a literary allusion, I'd say that postmodernists stand Don
Quixote on his head. While the man from La Mancha 's fecund imagination
populates the world with imaginary entities, postmodernist deconstruction
is bent on turning every meaningful occasion into a simulacrum, an
existential nonevent. Conceptualists destroy all manners of ideological
monsters in a bid to liberate humanity from the tyranny of paradigms.
Along the way, they turn parody onto itself, rendering it largely
meaningless. For parody feeds on the gap between mask and face,
appearance and reality, and it becomes superfluous when this gap
disappears, when the only real thing left is parody itself. Constitutive
imagination is supplanted with a deconstructive one, grand narrative with
the self-effacing narrative, constructive paradigm with the self-

deconstructing paradigm, and a self-fulfilling prophecy with a selfunfulfilling prophecy -- a prophecy that assures its own failure.
The paradigmatic urge to parody every paradigm produces ideological
arabesques, political ornaments, moral fugues, and other non- or antinarrative art forms. Their nonthematic unity precludes any attempt to
derive a rationale for action from this absurdist pastiche. If there is any
morale to be found here, it is a "plague on both your houses," or better
still, nam tataram vse ravno. . . . Conceptualist aesthetics can be amusing
or annoying depending on your mood, but it rarely fails to sap ethical
substance. Liberalism, conservatism, socialism, capitalism, democracy -this ideological claptrap enslaves the one who takes it seriously. The only
sure way to avoid totalitarian simulacrum is to keep constructive
imagination at bay and practice decontructive engagement. So, beware of
pathos and embrace irony, shun commitment and mock politics, poke fun
and take refuge in the safety of quotation marks, enjoy your solitary play
and always, always keep your protective irony unwrapped and ready to
use.
A characteristic quote from Prigov appears in your book, Mark. In it,
Prigov juxtaposes Sorokin and Chekhov as the perfect expressions of the
modernist and postmodernist sensibilities:
Precisely in his [Chekhov's] writing this exceedingly thin film of nice,
delicate and touching human relationships is meant to cover up, stave off
the terrifying subterranean chaos (terrifying from Chekhov's standpoint, of
course) that threatens to burst out and blow away with its foul breath the
thin, restraining film of culture. . . . [T]he film with which Sorokin deals
differs from the one envisioned by Chekhov, and not just in its historical
particulars but in its cardinally new intent. That is to say, his film no
longer masks the chaos but clings to man, envelops him, and more than
that -- it tries to usurp his place, his thoughts and feelings. Having come
that close to the human being, the film [of civility] brings him that much
closer to chaos (A. Prigov, "A im kazalos v Moskvu! v Moskvu!", Pp. 117116 in Vladimir Sorokin, Moskva: Russlit, 1992).
It is the modern man who struggles to insulate himself from chaos, Prigov
seems to tell us; the postmodern man doesn't avert his gaze and stares
right back at it. He may not bring chaos to heel, but at least he is not
going to feed himself illusions and half-truths about his ability to tame it.
Treating absurdity with discursive remedies is like spoon-feeding fish oil to
someone afflicted with Carposi sarcoma. Trim your political agenda,
decenter your whole being, anesthetize yourself with irony, and chaos

won't seem half as bad as it does to a sober-minded man stuck up on
reason and civility.
From the discourse-analytical standpoint, sign is the true substance of
discourse. It is meant to be transparent to meaning, its body completely
irrelevant to what it signifies. Looked at from this angle, the expression "I
love you" means the same thing whether it is written or verbalized,
framed in the 12 pitch or 10 pitch, rendered in capital or small case
letters, signed in Cyrillic or Japanese script -- its pure sign value stays
more or less the same. The voice-analytical perspective highlights live
speech, intonation, vocal delivery -- the iconic/indexical properties of
communication essential to pragmatist linguistics. What is said is no more
important than how it is said. The bodily accompaniment has significance
quite apart from the message's semantic content. Given an ironic twist,
the expression "I love you" may well mean the opposite of what its purely
semantic content implies. This is what Bakhtin tried to articulate when he
criticized Saussurean linguistics and urged attention to utterance,
intonation, life speech genres. This is what George Mead and Lev
Vygotsky seemed to have in mind when they urged to move beyond the
thought-sign toward the larger behavioral context of linguistic
consciousness. And this is, I take it, what Charles Peirce sought to
communicate when he brought into one continuum icons, indexes and
signs. (In my last year at the University of Leningrad I wrote a thesis on
Mead and Vygotsky, but now I see that it should have also covered Peirce
and Bakhtin).
Voice is silently present in every discourse. It is a bio-semiotic event that
links human discourse to subhuman communication and hints at the
origins we share with other mammals. This semiotic phenomenon is
marked by what Peirce calls "firstness" or "iconicity." Voice is a perfect
example of an icon, of a medium that is also a message. As an iconic body
of the sign, voice tends to stay in the background of symbolic exchange. It
does its job as a carrier of arbitrary meaning, the way a "red octagon" at
the intersection presents itself as a "stop sign." But just as the shape,
color and position of the stop sign mean something quite apart from the
sign's intended meaning, the voice in discourse means something quite
apart from what it was intended to mean. We behold it with all our
senses, paying special attention to the discrepancies between its
proclaimed intent and its non-assigned significance. Thus, we look beyond
the forbidden discourse and identify with an outlaw blessed by a sensible
voice and withhold our sympathy from a mendacious sheriff or a conniving
politician spouting a politically correct line. In real life, a communist party
member can show emotional intelligence even when he dresses his

message in the official terminological garb, while a dissident espousing
liberty and justice may acquit oneself as an intolerant person through his
vocalization. In all such cases, we are attuned to the various levels of
signification through the tension between iconic, indexical and symbolic
properties of discourse.
If voice is an icon marked by firstness, then the emotion it conveys is an
index characterized by "secondness." As every genuine index, emotion
partakes in the event about which it testifies without being identical with it
(weather vane comes to mind as another common example). Emotions
reveal attitudes that may or may not be readily accessible to the organism
itself. To the extent that these bodily dispositions become available to the
individual and are intentionally communicated to others, our emotions
acquire the quality of "thirdness" and turn into "signals." Sign's body
begins to shrivel in size and significance at this point. Discourse grows
oblivious of its vocal substrate as it moves away from live speech to
written communication. In purely symbolic communication, sign's value is
effectively severed from the sign's body, which is not supposed to mean
anything in and of itself, only what members of a language community
arbitrarily allow it to mean. All consciously signifying activity is, in this
respect, dissimulating, its iconic significance and indexical proximity to the
event being sacrificed to its symbolic value.
As discourse grows autonomous, it comes to dominate and colonize voice.
It turns into politically correct speech that wants to be taken at face value.
Politically correct signing subdues messy particulars with patented
universals in a drive to maximize certainty. Accounting designed to
capture things themselves systematically glosses over their qualities that
don't fit the accounting schema. Unfettered voice would have alerted us to
the recalcitrant particulars tossed around by chaotic crosscurrents, but
discourse sweeps the mess under the rug and imposes a seal of official
determination on a muddled situation. Where intonational dynamics
attuned to uncertainty quickly registers unpredictable changes in the
situation, discourse stays its course and glosses over the particulars that
won't fit into its ideological mold. Voice always tells us more than
discourse intends to. For we aren't just talking heads and mouthpieces for
master discourses; we are emotionally-charged, full-throated, gutwrenching voices whose iconic presence breaks though discourse. Voice
may turn into a whimper when discursive oppression is overwhelming, it
may sound like a howl of a wounded animal, it can become temporarily
inaudible, but it speaks volumes to us if we care to listen and pay close
attention to its peculiar semantics, syntaxis and style.

While postmodern hermeneutics privileges discourse over voice,
pragmatist hermeneutics favors voice over discourse. Unlike the
postmodernist who is bent on exposing voice as a mouthpiece of discourse
and reducing it to an archetype through intertextual deconstruction, the
pragmatist aims to recover voice within discourse, to appropriate a unique
experience shining through worn-out discursive devices. The relationship
between voice and discourse is not a transitive one, however. While voice
is a silent presence in every discourse, the reverse is not necessarily true.
We can't dialectically invert this proposition and say that discourse is a
silent presence in every voice. Voice is there before discourse the way
moaning is there before meaning. Minding precedes mind. Voice-sensitive
hermeneutics acknowledges that the individual needs some discourse to
communicate his experience to others, but it is always on the lookout for
novel, emergent, unpredictable inflections that subvert and update the
familiar discursive pattern. When the same text appears on more than one
occasion, it means a different thing. Thus, a quotation from Marx acquires
a new connotation depending on whether it is invoked by Lenin, Stalin,
Mao, Lukacs, Gramsci, Lifschitz or Ilienkov. Novel linguistic events
happen; to recover them, to discern a unique way in which a familiar
universal has been particularized is the task of pragmatic hermeneutics.
Postmodernists correctly sense the danger inherent in discourse
production. Language that speaks us is not just a figure of speech. It
reflects the all too familiar situation where one is forced to say something
one couldn't possibly mean, sign feelings one doesn't feel, suppress
emotions deemed to be politically correct. Hence, the need to rescue voice
buried under discourse. But is discourse really such a menace? Is it always
to be blamed? Should we agree with Prigov that "every language harbors
within itself a totalitarian ambition to conquer the entire world, to cover it
with its terms and who itself is an absolute truth" (Literaturnaia Gazeta,
05/12/93 ). To be sure, discourse can be used to clobber people over their
heads, but it also has therapeutic qualities, it helps us break the strangle
hold of the dead speech on our minds, and gives exquisite pleasures to
those who have mastered it. Freud's, Ricoeur's and Habermas's intuitions
are all on target here. Discourse does a lot more than postmodernists
would allow. It sickens and it heals, it enslaves and it empowers, it stunts
creativity and it opens new horizons of meaning -- it is a floating signifier
to which we attribute agency that rightfully belongs to those who speak
the discourse.
Remember Brodsky: "The poet is the instrument of language." This line
can be read as a variation on Heidegger's maxim "language speaks the
speaker." Brodsky played with this thesis when he gave a public talk at

the UNLV a few years ago. I remember him saying that few Russian
writers dared to immerse themselves in the Russian language and allowed
its powerful currents to stir them toward truth. He named Platonov as one
of the exceptions. Solzhenitsyn, he said, had a considerable linguistic
acumen, but he resisted language, didn't allow himself to be carried away
by it. There is some important truth encysted in this dictum. But there is
also some obfuscation. I asked Brodsky, how come Platonov, Solzhenitsyn
and Brodsky spoke the same Russian language, yet each was deposited
on a vastly different linguistic shore and had such remarkably different
insights to offer? Could it be that these individuals were not merely
hapless instruments in the hands of language but active beings guided in
their linguistic journeys by their emotional intelligence and moral
intuition? I need to check with those present how exactly Brodsky
answered my query, for my memories are rather dim. He might have said
something to the effect that it is language that lets you have any
particular insight, but I don't think he joined issue with me. Again, I find
pragmatist intuitions more inspiring than those that animated Heidegger
and his postmodernist followers. We only need to take a closer look at
Soviet discourse to realize that we speak language as much as language
speaks us.
If you take postmodernists literally, you would think that Soviet discourse
completely dominated life in the Soviet Union . Every human being
appears in this account as a parrot babbling official verbiage. The reality,
as we know, was more complex. Not all discursive practices fitted the
official mold. There were semi-official, non-official, dissident, anti-Soviet
discursive forms that existed along side endless variations on the master
discourse, variations that sometimes strayed so far from the main theme
that they effectively became themes in their own right. "Discursive
genres" strike me as a far better calibrated tool than "master discourse"
when it comes to accounting for the Soviet speech situation. Following
Bakhtin, we can picture language as a living continuum extending from
archetypal myths, mythologems and master discourses to discursive
fields, speech genres and speech dialects, all the way down to local lingos
and individual speech variations. What makes this a living continuum is a
speech act fueled by voice -- a voice that does not let itself to be
consumed by discourse. I would dare say that there are more discursive
fields, real or potential, in any modern society than there are individual
members who partake in them. This applies to a country as repressive as
the Soviet Union.
Even before Stalin's death, there were plenty of linguistic forms to chose
from. After 1953, the choice expanded dramatically. Overlapping or

independent as they were, Soviet discourses didn't swallow the individual
completely. The Soviet individual partook in many discursive fields,
borrowed from different terminological arsenals, and displayed a
bewildering variety of selves. Discursive fields left him considerable
leeway as to how the individual would terminate indeterminacy and
quantify oneself. The self emerging on the intersection of such fields was
decentered, it spilled over discursive borderlines and was only partially
predictable. Individual behavior was akin to a wave that moved in all sorts
of directions, occasionally registering as a particular with a definite
identity. The Soviet individual never ceased to emerge as a person and
repeatedly surprised himself and others with his nonconventional role
playing. Surely, he felt the gravitational pull of various idio-languages, but
these were only discursive blueprints. Which one would prove decisive in
shaping his quantum-self often could be predicted, but then only with a
margin of uncertainty.
If individual selves continued to emerge in Soviet society, so were
discursive fields contingent on identities assumed by individuals. Speech
genres proliferated, discursive communities multiplied, including many
that had no official stamp of approval. Few if any discursive norms were
sacred among Soviet citizens. Some were ignored, others given lip
service, still others honored in the breach. When a certain discursive form
would grow stale or oppressive, the Soviet individual used irony, parody,
travesty and kindred vocal strategies intended to dramatize an assumed
identity as bogus, to highlight one's speech as "merely" official discourse.
The Soviet individual was a master of his discourse, not its passive victim
whose identity was stamped on his forehead. For all its simulating and
dissimulating proclivities, Soviet society didn't abolish reality. Every
Potemkin portable village needed speakers to lend their voices to official
discourses. The vocal presence continued to be felt right in the middle of
an official spectacle. Discursively constructed in this haphazard fashion,
Soviet society was neither a complete chaos nor a monolithic order but a
semi-ordered chaos continuously shaped and reshaped by self-conscious
actors. Which is how human society looks when captured through the
pragmatist-interactionist optics. "Society transpires here as a universe of
interferentially overlapping fields, coalescing around symbols and
meanings and exerting various pressures on individuals caught in their
gravitational pull. When the borderlines separating these interactional
fields are strictly policed, they behave like 'bodies,' revealing their
'corpuscular' qualities. On other occasions, their 'wave-like' properties are
more in evidence, as crisscrossing identifications whittle away at their
thingness, making the fields appear as fuzzy, gaseous, easily penetrable

formations" (Shalin, 1986, Op. Cit., p. 18).
****
I have traveled full circle and returned to where I started: chaos,
uncertainty and moral responsibility. Postmodernists, in my view, come
down much too hard on discourse and are too pessimistic about our ability
to lead a sane existence in this absurd world. Their stark and cheerless
visage of the world steeped in chaos should not be taken literally. As any
resource, discourse could be misused and abused, but it is a valuable
resource nonetheless. It helps us get a handle on chaos, to convert it into
semi-ordered chaos or, if you prefer, semi-chaotic order. Contrary to
postmodernist wisdom, rhetoric matters. Liberal rhetoric breeds fewer
totalitarian consequences than communist rhetoric. Democratic discourse
lets you manage uncertainty in a more humane way than a nondemocratic
discourse. Looked at from this angle, "democracy is a historically specific
mode of managing uncertainty. [Its institutions] promote conflicting lifeforms, open up public discourse for an ever-widening range of
participants, and maximizes public's role in defining the terms in which
indeterminacy can be legitimately terminated" (Shalin, 1991, p. 266). This
approach shifts the theoretical focus from the economic to the
terminological means of production of objective reality. Nondemocratic
polities seek to monopolize this control, democratic societies decentralize
it. While the latter system increases the margin of uncertainty and spurs
dissipative processes, it offers more flexibility and furnishes a greater
over-all stability than the authoritarian polities do (this is one reason why
"plan" is currently bowing to "market"). "[Democracy] . . . recognizes that
uncertainty is inevitable and then turns it to positive account" (John
Dewey and John Childs, The Educational Frontiers, New York: AppletonCentury, 1933, p. 309). Indeed, democracy thrives on uncertainty,
encourages its members to judge particulars for themselves, and compels
us to revise our universals. It also designates an expansive private
domain where individuals are left to their own devices and can experiment
with unorthodox terminological practices.
Democratic discourse is superior to its alternatives in yet another respect:
it cultivates human voice and rewards emotional intelligence. These
qualities indispensable to sane living fall under the heading of civic
culture. Civic virtue thrives in the emotional culture which promotes trust,
tolerance, prudence, compassion, humor, and it wilts when overexposed
to suspicion, hatred, vanity, cruelty and sarcasm (you will find this
statement reprinted from my newspaper column on the back of our
conference program). Mistaken are those who pin their hopes on correct

political "signals" and dismiss emotional littering as mere "noise." The
vocal medium is very much the message when it comes to politics. While
emotions that confer dignity on the other are democracy's lifeblood,
violent emotions that hold others in contempt subvert its sacred thrust.
Emotional sanity is, consequently, as central to democracy as discursive
political rationality.
If democracy is aching today, it is in part because we have neglected the
emotional intelligence which nourishes it. Civil rights are no substitute for
civility. Nor is political correctness, whether it comes in radical, liberal,
conservative, or any other garb. Political correctness is ultimately a failure
of moral imagination. I use the latter term to designate our ability to wade
through unwieldy circumstances and bring sanity into this world without
succumbing to absurd or closing eyes to chaos. You can't bring chaos to
heel but you can tame it, and then some, if you are willing to makes sense
together and cultivate your emotional intelligence. This is where Chekhov
becomes relevant again.
I couldn't disagree more with Prigov about this remarkable figure on the
Russian cultural scene. Prigov's take on Chekhov as a quintessential
modernist and Sorokin as his postmodern antithesis is very clever. It is
entirely consistent with the Nietzschean ethos of radical postmodernism,
which dismisses a call for civility as a failure of nerve, a species of feintheartedness to be remedied by the robust postmodernist invectives. I
read Chekhov differently. In my reckoning, Anton Chekhov showed moral
imagination when he refused to succumb to chaos and urged his
countrymen to practice political sanity and cultivate emotional intelligence
in a society that was all messed up. He countered the Russian absurd with
his tactics of small-scale projects and took solace in civic virtue. His advice
still rings true today: "Start with yourself, reach out to your neighbors,
communicate to others your good will, give credit to your enemies
wherever it is due, have courage to admit when the problem has no ready
solution, avoid grand-standing and take up small deeds. In sum, make
sure your emotions are intelligent and your intellect is emotionally sane"
(forgive me for yet another auto-citation).
Here is a real life parable that illuminates the small-scale-deeds theory. A
man is walking down along the seashore after a storm which washed
ashore countless little sea creatures. A little boy is picking them up,
throwing them back to see. "Why are you doing this," asks the man.
"There are hundreds of thousands of them -- what difference does it make
if you save a few?" The boy picks up another little see horse, returns it to
its elements, and says: "It makes a difference for this one . . . and for this

one . . . and for this one. . . ."
As world-weary adults, postmodernists see no point in trying. They
allowed themselves to be mesmerized by the enormity of the task and the
sheer dimensions of chaos. They convinced themselves that constructive
efforts are absurd in the face of impending destruction and imminent
death. Hence, their ethics is nihilist, their engagement is deconstructive,
their ironic strategies are aimed at discourse communities that haven't yet
fully unraveled. The ethics of uncertainty that pragmatists urge for our
age rejects cynicism, calls for experimentalism, and appeals to our
emotional intelligence and moral imagination. This ethics is premised on
the notion that individual action makes a difference, that it matters
whether we add a quantum of sanity to this world or stare blankly as it
sinks into the vortex of insanity, whether we stay ironically aloof when
someone is consumed by chaos or jump into its current to save a
struggling soul, whether we use discourse to ridicule speech communities
or to repair and expand the pluralistic universe. An overdose of ironic
detachment breeds cruelty that might have been avoided were we to add
a little pathos to our discursive vocalization.
Now is a good time to pause and look into the mirror. The reader must be
wondering if I ever dismount the high moral horse and get down to the
dirty particulars. Indeed, how much posturing is there in my pragmatist
rhetoric? Or to put it in more neutral terms, Is there any flesh and blood
person who meets the standard of emotional intelligence? Sergei
Averintsev alerted me to this question in his February 4, 1997 , letter to
me where he offered feedback on my "Notes on the Recessive Genes in
Russian Culture" (Zvezda, 1995, No. 6). In this article, I talk about the
Chekhov-Losev's perspective on emotional intelligence and moral
imagination. "I was puzzled by your reference to A. F. Losev, who boasted
his contempt for Chekhov," Averintsev writes:
Please forgive me, but did you read his main works (especially his
Dialectics of Myth) where he heaps scorn on liberalism and everything that
reaks of "Renaissance" and "new Europe "? . . . Aleksei Federovich, may
he rest in peace and glory, was an unusually gifted and hard-working
man, whose name I cherish, all the more so that for a while I had an
informal relationship with him and was somewhat of a student of his -but you are talking about quite different things. Far more appropriate
would be to mention here the name of M. M. Bakhtin who developed the
concept of dialogical truth and really knew how to talk to people from
different walks of life. Generally speaking, the lists you compile, especially
when they are intended for a Russian audience, appear to be

unexpectedly arbitrary, which raises the question about the genre. When
the right and the left compile their lists of "our kind of people" and "their
kind of people" . . . that suites them fine; but can you, who is opposed to
generalizations and committed to truth as "objective uncertainty," do the
same? "There are 9 and 60 ways of constructing tribal ways,// And -every -- single -- one -- of -- them -- is -- right!", wrote Kipling (did he
anticipated postmodernism?); by the same token, there are 9 and 60
ways of being tolerant, of being intolerant, of [.]mixing tolerance and
practicing intolerance, and so on.
I take this to mean that no one has a monopoly on moral imagination.
Quantum selves that we all are, we always find an occasion to fall flat on
our faces. I know I do. That is, I espouse emotional intelligence, but I
can't say my actions are always emotionally sane. Sometimes my voice
cracks with intonations that make me cringe. And not only when I sing (an
avocational pursuit), but also in other spheres where my competence is on
the line. Once again, Chekhov's experience comes to mind. Here is a man
who hoped to squeeze a slave out of his blood stream, drop by slavish
drop, and assiduously cultivated intelligentnost. Was he always up to the
challenge? Not really. Just read his correspondence, check the memoirs of
his contemporaries, and you will see that he was all too human in
practicing the craft of living. But he surely tried, and all of us are better
off for his effort. The quantum of sanity he imparted to the world has
made it a touch more bearable for all of us. Now, it is incumbent on us to
try to do the same.
According to cosmologists, the fate of transgalactic formations, if not of
the whole universe, turns on the strange happenings in the quantum
micro-world. Chaos theorists tell us that a little grain of sand can become
a focal point around which chaos coalesces into a newly emergent order.
So, maybe the quantum of sanity we bring into the world would ultimately
determine whether it acts like a semi-chaotic order or a disorderly chaos.

